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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-2198
___________
QIAO MIAO LIU,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A095-862-218)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Annie S. Garcy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 19, 2013
Before: FISHER, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 20, 2013)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Qiao Miao Liu petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”), which affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision
denying her relief from removal. We will deny the petition for review.

Because the parties are familiar with the history and facts of the case, we will
recount the events in summary fashion. Liu was granted asylum in 2005, but the Board
reversed the decision on the Government’s appeal. We granted Liu’s petition for review
and remanded the matter for further proceedings, noting that the BIA had failed to
address pertinent evidence. See Liu v. Att’y Gen., 300 F. App’x 137 (3d Cir. 2008). The
Board then issued an order remanding to the IJ for further proceedings and a new
decision. A new master hearing was held on September 7, 2011, at which Liu was
questioned about the status of her husband and her attempt to authenticate two village
notices she had presented in support of her application. 1 The IJ issued a written opinion
finding that Liu had failed to meet her burden of proof for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The BIA
dismissed Liu’s appeal, agreeing that Liu had failed to meet her burden of proof as to
asylum and withholding of removal, and that she had waived any claims for relief under
the CAT by failing to address the issue in her brief. 2 Liu then filed a timely, counseled
petition for review.
1

Liu argues that a “master calendar was held on June 29, 2010” and that the transcript of
the hearing is missing from the record. Petitioner’s Brief at 17, 23. However, a “Notice
of Hearing in Removal Proceedings,” dated June 29, 2010, states that the master hearing
was reset for August 24, 2010, “for DHS to retrieve its record—by agreement off
record.” A.R. 280. The notice is stamped, “This notice served on both parties in open
court on above date by IJ A. Garcy.” Id. Thus, it appears that both parties were present
on June 29, 2010, and in proceedings off the record, agreed to continue the hearing to a
later date (the hearing eventually took place on September 7, 2011).
2

Liu does not contest the finding that she waived any claims for CAT relief, so we will
2

We review the agency’s factual findings, including findings regarding likelihood
of persecution, see Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 382-83 (3d Cir. 2010), under the
substantial evidence standard. See Briseno–Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d
Cir. 2007). We uphold the factual findings “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Although the IJ found that Liu was a credible witness in testifying to her genuine
fear of persecution, thereby satisfying the first, subjective component of the “wellfounded fear of persecution” test, see Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir.2008),
the facts of record do not establish the required second, objective component of the test,
namely, that her fear of persecution is objectively reasonable, id. The BIA properly
considered and weighed State Department reports which provided evidence contradicting
Liu’s claim that her fear of persecution is objectively reasonable, see Yu, 513 F.3d at 349
(State Department reports may constitute substantial evidence), and also gave close
consideration to the evidence submitted by Liu. It considered the documents Liu
submitted from China, including two unsigned, unauthenticated notices from the “Village
Committee” purportedly addressed to Liu’s husband, and a letter from Liu’s mother-inlaw. However, as the BIA’s opinion explained in detail, because the record reflects that
such documents were either unauthenticated or lacked minimal indicia of trustworthiness,
the BIA gave them less weight in its consideration of Liu’s application.

not address those claims further.
3

While we have held that failure to authenticate under 8 C.F.R. § 287.6 does not
warrant “per se exclusion of documentary evidence, and a petitioner is permitted to prove
authenticity in another manner,” the BIA correctly held that Liu’s failure to authenticate
her evidence in any manner undermines its evidentiary value. Chen v. Gonzales, 434
F.3d 212, 218 n.6 (3d Cir.2005). The first Village Committee Notice is confusing, as it
appears that it is addressed to a woman. A.R. 100. 3 Further, although Liu testified that
village officials told her mother-in-law that the notices would never be authenticated, the
unsworn letter from Liu’s mother-in-law does not mention this statement, nor does it
indicate that she made any other attempt to authenticate the notices. 4 Given the
unauthenticated statements, and the other record evidence, including the State
Department reports, the record does not compel us to find that Liu has an objectively
reasonable fear of persecution. As she failed to meet the burden of proof for entitlement
to asylum, she necessarily failed to meet the higher burden for withholding of removal
3

The notice states in part, “If you were Chinese citizen and had one child, you would be
the object to insert an IUD.” It notes that Liu and her husband have two children, and
concludes that her husband is required “to have ligation operation.” A.R. 100. While it
is possible that the “you” in the first sentence is used in a general sense, the rest of the
notice appears to use the word “you” to specifically refer to Liu’s husband.

4

Liu argues that she cannot challenge the IJ’s finding that the documents were not
properly authenticated because the transcript of the June 29, 2010 hearing is missing.
However, as noted, it appears that Liu’s attorney agreed to proceed off the record on that
date. Further, at the merits hearing on September 7, 2011, after determining that the
notices had not been properly authenticated, the IJ asked Liu’s attorney if he had any
response about the lack of authentication, and he said he did not. A.R. 90. Thus, if he
disagreed with the IJ’s authentication requirements, he had an opportunity to state his
objections on the record.
4

under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir.
2003).
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
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